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Five	views:	What	we’ve	learned	from	20	years	of	the
European	Central	Bank
The	European	Central	Bank	was	established	20	years	ago	today	on	1	June	1998.	To	mark	the	anniversary,	we
asked	five	academics	to	give	their	views	on	the	lessons	learned	from	two	decades	of	the	ECB,	and	their	predictions
on	what	might	lie	in	store	for	both	the	ECB	and	the	euro	over	the	next	20	years.
Paul	De	Grauwe:	Lessons	of	the	financial	crisis	for	the	ECB
Waltraud	Schelkle:	The	ECB	at	20:	Not	like	its	boring	older	brother
Sebastian	Diessner:	Happy	20th	Birthday,	ECB	–	here’s	to	many	more?
Hjalte	Lokdam:	The	next	20	years	may	see	the	Eurozone	become	a	federal	(economic)	state
Shahin	Vallée:	The	Eurozone	crisis	unearthed	profound	flaws	in	the	architecture	of	the	euro	area	that
make	reviewing	the	design	and	operations	of	the	ECB	a	necessity
Paul	De	Grauwe:	Lessons	of	the	financial	crisis	for	the	ECB
At	the	end	of	the	1980s,	the	Delors	Committee	created	the	blueprint	of	the	future	central	bank	of	the
European	Monetary	Union.	This	was	a	time	of	(relative)	financial	stability.	No	major	financial	crisis	had
occurred	in	Western	Europe	since	the	Second	World	War.
This	was	also	the	time	when	monetarism	was	very	popular,	both	in	academia	and	among	central
bankers.	Monetarism	told	the	central	bankers	two	things	that	they	loved.	First,	the	central	bank	should	return	to	its
core	business,	which	is	stabilising	the	purchasing	power	of	money.	Or	put	differently	(but	equivalently),	stabilising	the
price	level.	Second,	in	order	to	achieve	the	objective	of	price	stability,	the	central	bank	should	be	made	politically
independent.
In	the	past,	most	central	banks	were	created,	not	to	stabilise	the	price	level,	but	to	stabilise	the	financial	system
(especially	the	banking	system).	The	historical	experience	showed	that	an	unregulated	financial	system	without	a
lender	of	last	resort	is	inherently	unstable.	But	all	this	was	deemed	to	be	of	little	importance	when	the	ECB	was
created.	If	the	ECB	maintained	price	stability,	so	went	the	theory,	all	the	rest	would	follow	automatically:	low	inflation
would	ensure	that	the	economic	system	is	stable,	and	this	in	turn	would	allow	efficient	financial	markets	to	deliver
financial	stability.
The	awakening	was	rude.	After	a	period	of	euphoria	and	bubbles,	during	which	the	ECB	(but	not	only	the	ECB)	stood
on	the	sidelines	and	did	little	to	counter	speculative	frenzy,	the	crash	came	in	2008.	Suddenly	the	ECB	learned	that
the	script	had	to	be	radically	changed.	What	did	the	ECB	learn?
First,	a	central	bank	should	care	about	financial	stability	as	much	as	it	does	about	price	stability.	Price	stability	is	not
a	guarantee	for	financial	stability.	Conversely,	financial	instability	endangers	price	stability.	The	idea	that	the	central
bank	should	only	care	about	price	stability	had	to	be	thrown	into	the	garbage	bin.
Second,	a	central	bank	of	a	monetary	union	should	extend	its	lender	of	last	resort	function	to	the	government	bond
markets.	The	ECB	found	out	during	the	sovereign	debt	crisis	of	2010-12	that	the	government	bond	markets	are
inherently	unstable.	As	none	of	the	sovereigns	is	backed	by	its	own	central	bank,	these	sovereigns	can	easily
become	victims	of	self-fulfilling	panic	that	leads	investors	to	dump	the	government	bonds	deemed	risky	and	to	buy
safe-haven	bonds	in	the	monetary	union.	This	leads	to	massive	destabilising	capital	flows	within	the	union	that	only
the	ECB	can	stop.	It	took	the	ECB	some	time	to	understand	this,	but	in	2012	it	stepped	into	the	fray	and	announced
its	OMT-programme	that	saved	the	Eurozone	from	collapse.
Third,	the	political	independence	of	a	central	bank	is	fine	in	normal	times.	In	crisis	times	when	the	existence	of	the
sovereign	is	at	stake,	the	independence	of	the	central	bank	is	limited.	That	is	certainly	the	case	in	standalone
countries,	like	the	UK.	There	can	be	no	doubt	that	when	the	UK	government	experiences	an	existential	crisis	the
government	will	(and	should)	prevail	over	the	central	bank	which	will	be	forced	to	provide	liquidity.
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This	should	also	be	the	rule	in	the	Eurozone.	But	here	there	is	a	complication:	there	is	one	central	bank	and	19
sovereigns,	none	of	which	can	impose	its	will	on	the	ECB.	This	creates	uncertainty	about	the	willingness	of	the	ECB
to	support	the	sovereigns	in	future	crisis	situations.	And	these	are	coming	for	sure.	This	uncertainty	will	continue	to
be	a	major	source	of	fragility	for	the	Eurozone.
Paul	De	Grauwe	–	LSE,	European	Institute
Professor	Paul	De	Grauwe	is	the	John	Paulson	Chair	in	European	Political	Economy	at	the	LSE’s	European	Institute.
___________________________________________
Waltraud	Schelkle:	The	ECB	at	20:	Not	like	its	boring	older	brother
The	ECB	was	the	brainchild	of	an	intellectual	fashion.	The	supranational	central	bank	was	meant	to
demonstrate	‘the	advantage	of	tying	government’s	hands’	by	delegating	policies	to	independent
agencies.	The	brainchild	was	expected	to	be	conservative	and	aloof	like	its	boring	older	brother,	the
Bundesbank:	narrowly	focusing	on	price	stability	and	independent	by	being	uncooperative	with	fiscal
authorities.	In	its	early	years,	the	ECB	seemed	to	live	up	to	these	expectations	of	a	prematurely	ageing	posterchild	of
monetary	conservatism.
Yet,	the	ECB	has	grown	up	to	be	an	agile,	boisterous	teenager.	Like	all	youth,	it	is	at	times	inconsistent	and	devious
in	its	behaviour.	But	it	has	also	been	a	necessary	challenge	to	its	conservative	progenitors.	How	come?	The
Eurozone	crisis	forced	the	ECB	to	challenge	the	original	understanding	of	independence	as	separation	from	fiscal
policy	on	which	influential	German	commentators	publicly	insisted.
During	the	crisis,	the	ECB	noted	that	it	needed	cooperation	from	fiscal	authorities	or	else	it	would	have	to	throw	a
permanent	lifeline	of	liquidity	to	insolvent	zombie	banks.	The	ECB	thus	insisted	on	institution	building	that	would
enshrine	a	new	division	of	labour.	It	requested	the	creation	of	an	emergency	fund	in	return	for	the	first	bond-buying
programme	and	a	banking	union	in	return	for	the	announcement	of	Outright	Monetary	Transactions	that	put	it	on	par
with	private	holders	of	bonds	should	they	default.	These	quid-pro-quos	provided	time	for	democratically	elected
governments	to	come	to	agreements	that	cannot	be	taken	over	night.
These	institutions	can	underpin	independent	central	banking	in	that	they	prevent	the	ECB’s	hands	being	constantly
forced	by	market	panic.	Yet,	this	puts	the	ECB	at	loggerheads	with	the	old	disciplinarians.	They	see	cooperation	with
governments	as	a	slippery	slope	to	‘politicisation’.	The	response	of	the	German	government	has	been	to	politicise	the
succession	of	Mario	Draghi	and	send	Bundesbank	President	Weidmann	into	the	campaign.	There	is	a	precedent	to
this	politicisation:	the	first	two	chief	economists	of	the	ECB	had	to	be	German,	even	though	their	academic
credentials	were	decidedly	underwhelming.
One	lesson	of	the	first	20	years	of	the	ECB	is	that	the	foremost	supporters	of	central	bank	independence	are	also	its
greatest	threat.	The	confrontation	with	these	disciplinarians	made	the	ECB	a	much	more	interesting	central	bank
than	anybody	had	feared	or	hoped	for.	I	believe	that	it	will	stay	that	way.	The	next	20	years	will	be	no	less	interesting
as	German	policymakers	will	continue	to	interfere.	But	this	interference	will	ultimately	meet	with	limited	success.	The
next	ECB	President,	be	it	Weidmann	or	not,	will	have	to	lead	an	institution	of	the	future,	not	of	an	outdated	past.
Waltraud	Schelkle	–	LSE,	European	Institute
Waltraud	Schelkle	is	Associate	Professor	of	Political	Economy	at	the	European	Institute	of	the	London	School	of
Economics.
___________________________________________
Sebastian	Diessner:	Happy	20th	Birthday,	ECB	–	here’s	to	many	more?
The	ECB’s	first	ten	years	of	seemingly	worry-free	childhood	were	followed	by	ten	more	troublesome
years	as	a	teen	and	adolescent.	When	Lehman	Brothers	filed	for	bankruptcy	in	September	2008,	the
deceptively	calm	waters	of	the	first	decade	of	monetary	union	soon	made	way	for	a	protracted	financial
crisis	that	embroiled	large	parts	of	the	Eurozone.
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Amid	the	ensuing	turmoil,	the	ECB’s	more	recent	history	will	long	be	remembered	for	Mario	Draghi’s	bold
announcement	to	do	‘whatever	it	takes	to	preserve	the	euro’	–	a	surprise	commitment	squeezed	into	a	speech	at	a
London	conference	in	the	summer	of	2012.	The	commitment	itself	–	to	not	let	the	Eurozone	be	torn	apart	by
diverging	government	bond	spreads	–	is	often	said	to	have	calmed	panicking	markets	with	near-magical	efficacy.	But
once	we	scratch	beyond	the	surface,	we	see	that	while	bold	action	by	the	central	bank	was	indeed	essential,	the
credibility	of	Draghi’s	commitment	was	ultimately	contingent	on	the	tacit	collaboration	and	supporting	actions	of
powerful	Eurozone	governments.
The	biggest	lesson	we	have	thus	learned	–	or	may	still	need	to	learn	–	from	the	past	two	decades	is	that	while	the
immediate	fate	of	Europe’s	monetary	union	can	be	safeguarded	by	the	mighty	central	bankers	in	Frankfurt,	its	long-
term	sustainability	cannot.	Rather,	the	ECB	is	in	need	of	credible	and	cooperative	counterparts.	In	the	first	instance,
this	requires	not	merely	the	creation	of	an	outright	supranational	fiscal	authority,	as	is	often	argued,	but	also	a
readiness	among	monetary	and	fiscal	authorities	to	cooperate:	while	Eurozone	governments	need	to	come	round	to
backing	the	ECB	where	need	be,	the	ECB	should	equally	not	let	itself	be	driven	by	a	mistaken	understanding	of
central	bank	independence	as	a	strict	and	uncompromising	divorce	between	monetary	and	fiscal	policy.	While	the
line	between	independence	and	cooperation,	as	well	as	that	between	‘normal’	and	crisis	times,	might	be	difficult	to
draw,	renewed	efforts	need	to	be	undertaken	to	clarify	the	central	bank’s	and	Eurozone	governments’	respective
responsibilities	–	as	well	as	to	gain	a	better	understanding	about	the	deep-seated	uncertainties	that	might	render
such	ex	ante	clarification	difficult.
While	the	upcoming	June	summit	of	European	heads	of	state	and	government	is	unlikely	to	produce	anything	beyond
a	Eurozone	budget	line	that	hardly	deserves	its	name,	the	ECB	might	eventually	run	out	of	time	to	obtain	meaningful
support.	Mounting	instability	in	the	government	bond	market	of	Italy,	for	instance,	could	well	mean	that	the	central
bank’s	promise	to	do	‘whatever	it	takes’	will	be	called	into	question	sooner	rather	than	later.	After	the	formative
period	of	its	childhood	and	teenage	years,	Eurozone	governments	now	need	to	ensure	that	the	European	Central
Bank	benefits	from	an	independent	adulthood,	but	within	a	cooperative	European	family,	if	the	monetary	union	is	to
strive	for	another	20	years	or	more.
Sebastian	Diessner	–	LSE
Sebastian	Diessner	is	a	PhD	candidate	in	political	economy	at	the	LSE’s	European	Institute.	
___________________________________________
Hjalte	Lokdam:	The	next	20	years	may	see	the	Eurozone	become	a	federal	(economic)	state
One	fairly	obvious	lesson	of	the	first	two	decades	of	the	ECB’s	existence	is	that	the	separation	of
responsibility	for	monetary	and	fiscal	policy	is	unsustainable.	The	rules-based	approach	to	economic
policy	that	was	created	in	order	to	support	the	functioning	of	the	single	monetary	policy	showed	its
weaknesses	early	on,	with	the	failure	to	discipline	France	and	Germany	for	infringing	the	Stability	and
Growth	Pact.	This	failure	was,	following	some	of	Michel	Aglietta’s	and	Charles	Goodhart’s	writings,	fundamentally
linked	to	the	question	of	sovereignty;	while	monetary	sovereignty	had	been	transferred	to	the	ECB,	Member	States
retained	and	jealously	guarded	their	political	sovereignty,	particularly	within	the	fiscal	domain.	The	economic
convergence	that	was	‘supposed’	to	happen	following	the	introduction	of	the	euro	happened	neither	by	the	Member
States’	own	initiative	nor	by	the	invisible	but	firm	disciplining	hand	of	the	market.
In	the	Eurozone	crisis,	the	full	consequences	of	this	disjunction	of	sovereignty	emerged	and	the	monetary	union
entered	an	existential	crisis.	The	ECB	then	stepped	in	and	acted	as	if	its	mandate	was	the	political	stability	of	the
Eurozone	rather	than	the	much	narrower	price	stability	mandate.	In	doing	so,	the	ECB	reintegrated	monetary	and
political	sovereignty	and	supplied	the	radical	assurance	that	the	markets	needed	at	the	time:	there	was	a	strong
political	will	behind	the	euro.
With	the	Outright	Monetary	Transactions	programme	in	particular,	the	ECB	suspended	market	evaluations	of
Member	States’	public	debts	and	finances	and	introduced	the	logic	of	raison	d’État:	against	existential	threats,	the
political	community	asserts	itself	in	any	way	necessary	to	assure	its	own	survival.	In	the	process,	some	of	the	core
normative	principles	(rationality	of	markets,	rule	of	law)	of	the	EMU	were,	at	least	temporarily,	suspended.
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But	the	ECB	did	not	act	entirely	on	its	own.	The	Member	States	similarly	moved	to	centralise	and	strengthen	public
powers	to	regulate	not	only	financial	markets	and	banks	but	also	the	economic	structure	of	the	constituent	states.
During	the	crisis,	therefore,	the	Eurozone,	in	important	part	due	to	the	ECB’s	initiative,	moved	towards	reintegrating
monetary	and	political	sovereignty.	While	this	process	is	incomplete,	it	points	to	what	we	might	expect	the	Eurozone
to	look	like	in	20	years.	If	the	euro	hasn’t	fallen	at	the	feet	of	resurgent	nationalisms,	we	might	expect	the	Eurozone,
whether	larger	or	smaller,	to	move	towards	centralising	political	responsibility	for	the	economic	affairs	of	the
constituent	states.	We	might,	in	other	words,	expect	the	Eurozone	to	become	a	federal	(economic)	state.	Hopefully	it
will	also	be	democratic.
Hjalte	Lokdam	–	LSE
Hjalte	Lokdam	is	a	PhD	candidate	in	political	economy	at	the	LSE’s	European	Institute.
___________________________________________
Shahin	Vallée:	The	Eurozone	crisis	unearthed	profound	flaws	in	the	architecture	of	the	euro
area	that	make	reviewing	the	design	and	operations	of	the	ECB	a	necessity
Coming	out	of	its	teenage	years,	the	European	Central	Bank	could	be	happy	about	its	emergence	from
a	violent	teenage	crisis	and	entry	into	adulthood.	But	the	reality	is	somewhat	more	concerning.	The
ECB,	while	a	beautiful	construct	in	the	abstract,	still	rests	on	a	shaky	economic,	institutional	and
political	structure.	The	issues	that	arise	from	having	a	currency	without	a	State,	described	by	Tommaso	Padoa
Schioppa	as	the	central	problem	of	the	single	currency,	have	become	all	the	more	visible	in	the	last	few	years	and
have	not	been	properly	addressed.
The	ECB	will	therefore	continue	to	face	daunting	challenges	over	the	next	decades	and	its	response	and	attitude	in
the	face	of	financial	and	political	adversity	will	be	critical	to	the	euro	area	and	more	broadly	to	Europe’s	future.	There
are	several	issues	that	are	particularly	important	for	the	ECB	in	the	next	20	years
First,	its	doctrine	as	a	lender	of	last	resort	to	both	banks	and	governments	has	been	tested	and	while	it	appears	to
have	settled	for	an	effective	operational	framework,	there	is	still	considerable	uncertainty	about	the	predictability	of	its
function	as	a	lender	of	last	resort	to	banks,	in	particular	in	the	use	of	Emergency	Liquidity	Assistance,	which	remains
decentralised.	Its	backstop	to	government	debt	markets	in	the	event	of	redenomination	risk	remains	untested.	The
introduction	of	the	Open	Market	Transactions	programme	in	the	summer	of	2012	has	played	a	critical	role	in
stabilising	the	euro	area,	but	it	has	never	been	used	and	its	architecture	remains	subject	to	risks,	in	particular	due	to
the	fact	that	a	financial	assistance	programme	is	required	for	its	activation.
Second,	the	question	of	the	capitalisation	of	the	European	Central	Bank	and	the	National	Central	Bank	remains	an
important	one	because	it	betrays	a	form	of	discomfort	for	the	risk	that	the	central	banks	should	undertake	during	the
conduct	of	its	monetary	operations	and	a	need	for	a	form	of	fiscal	or	sovereign	backing.	The	ECB	has	developed	a
shaky	notion	of	financial	independence	that	requires	central	banks	to	have	sufficient	levels	of	equity	to	undertake	its
missions.	But	this	doctrine	is	intellectually	flawed	and	applied	with	a	great	degree	of	inconsistency.	The	ECB	ought	to
clarify	that	central	bank	equity	is	an	accounting	fiction	and	that	unlike	a	commercial	bank	it	can	function	with	or
without	capital.
Third,	the	question	of	the	irreversibility	of	the	single	currency	has	also	been	a	critical	point	of	tension	in	the	conduct
of	the	ECB	operations	over	the	last	decade.	Indeed,	while	the	ECB	has	repeated	the	mantra	that	the	euro	was
irreversible,	it	has	not	always	behaved	accordingly.	Indeed,	the	introduction	of	capital	controls	in	Cyprus	or	Greece,
although	presented	as	a	safeguard	measure	for	the	stability	of	the	financial	system,	effectively	introduced	a	break-
down	of	the	par	convertibility	of	money	across	national	borders	sanctioned	by	the	ECB.	Since	then,	two	events	have
challenged	further	the	notion	that	the	euro	is	truly	irreversible:	the	Brexit	referendum	and	the	realisation	that	Member
States	could	vote	and	decide	to	leave	the	European	Union;	and	the	emergence	in	the	euro	area	of	political	parties
officially	preparing	for	the	introduction	of	a	parallel	currency	and/or	a	euro	exit.
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Finally,	the	question	of	central	bank	independence	has	evolved	tremendously	since	the	concept	emerged	in	the
1980s	and	1990s.	The	ECB,	while	retaining	its	independence,	needs	to	radically	increase	its	transparency	and	its
level	of	accountability.	At	the	very	least,	it	should	release	the	votes	of	the	governing	council	members	on	policy
issues	as	the	Federal	Reserve	does.	This	will	become	even	more	important	now	that	a	rotating	mechanism	has	been
introduced	and	given	not	all	central	bank	governors	are	voting.	In	addition,	it	needs	to	release	fuller	sets	of	accounts
from	its	policy	discussions.	The	appointment	process	also	needs	to	become	more	transparent	and	the	executive
board	members	should	face	a	proper	hearing/vetting	by	the	European	Parliament.	Without	prejudice	to	the
independence	of	the	Central	Bank,	the	dialogue	between	the	Commission,	the	Council	and	the	Central	Bank	should
be	enhanced	to	ensure	that	while	not	diverting	from	its	mandate,	the	ECB	more	actively	contributes	to	the	economic
policy	objectives	of	the	union	as	the	Treaty	demands.
All	in	all,	the	Eurozone	crisis	unearthed	profound	flaws	in	the	architecture	of	the	euro	area	that	make	reviewing	the
design	and	operations	of	the	ECB	a	necessity.	So	far,	the	intellectual	and	academic	debate	has	focused	on	the
economic,	fiscal	and	political	reality,	but	the	monetary	realm	should	not	be	neglected.
Shahin	Vallée	–	LSE
Shahin	Vallée	is	a	Senior	Economist	at	Soros	Fund	Management	and	a	PhD	candidate	at	the	LSE’s	European
Institute.
Please	read	our	comments	policy	before	commenting.
Note:	EUROPP’s	editors	are	grateful	to	Sebastian	Diessner	for	his	initiative	in	putting	this	article	together.	The	article
gives	the	views	of	the	authors,	not	the	position	of	EUROPP	–	European	Politics	and	Policy	or	the	London	School	of
Economics.	Featured	image	credit:	Jonas	M	Luster(CC	BY-SA	3.0)
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